The rise of “moderate” and “hard-line” factions in North Korea

In response to our exclusive on Kim Jong-un’s latest gift of a 100 copy book, the DPRK threatened the destruction of those who pass on internal information to the outside world. That neither the military nor the psychological warfare infrastructure issued this external threat, but the Ministry of People’s Security – a domestic police force – is unprecedented.

This can therefore be read not only as an external threat, but also as an internal threat to our informants within the regime. Their information cannot come in a constant stream, but whenever it does, it has been accurate.

Over time, several of these informants have independently provided accounts and observations of a similar nature, assuring verification at the highest level. Confrontations and factional infighting are arising within the power elite, of the kind that would have been unthinkable under Kim Jong-il.

In other words, on the premise of disagreeing on how to proceed with Kim Jong-il’s legacy, there have for the first time come to be “hard-line” and “moderate” factions.

The “moderate” faction is led by Jang Song-thaek, who is stressing the importance of the People’s Economy and leading North Korea to be a ‘strong and prosperous country’. The “hard-line” faction comprises the Party’s Organisation and Guidance Department and the military, who are insisting on nuclear development in the name of Songun.

In this regard, Kim Jong-un’s pronouncements about the Byungjin (nuclear and economy in tandem) policy can be taken as a sign that Kim Jong-un’s course is reactive rather than proactive.

This factionalism is not primarily about opposing ideologies with regard to future policy direction, but rather, has historical origins that stem from the ‘side-branch’ system.

Kim Jong-il said that for the leadership tree to grow straight, the branches that sprout in other directions must be cut off. His policy, executed by the OGD, suppressed close family members who might deviate from the principle of absolute rule with dynastic Kim authority vested in himself alone.

For decades, Kim Jong-il’s younger sister Kim Kyong-hui and her husband Jang Song-thaek were designated side-branches. This is why Jang Song-thaek had been relegated to comparatively minor roles in the Party’s OGD.

In this way, the antipathy between the all-powerful OGD and Kim Jong-un’s closest guardian is actually the most problematic aspect of Kim Jong-il’s legacy.

In the beginning of Kim Jong-un’s rule, the “moderate” faction was in the lead with Kim Kyong-hui featuring prominently. The Rodong Sinmun, which can only feature news about the ruling Kim on the front page of its political section, broke from tradition and featured Prime Minister Choi Yong Rim, the proxy of Kim Kyong-hui.

At the same time, Jang Song-thaek’s Ministry of People’s Security was promoted into the National Defense Committee and had its sphere of influence extended.

In relation, Choe Ryong Hae, who had worked in the Youth League under Jang Song-thaek, was appointed as head of the military’s General Political Bureau in spite of his civilian background and lack of military experience.

The reason why the OGD and military begrudged this appointment to take place was because Choe Ryong Hae and Kim Jong-il had close connections through their fathers. Although Kim Jong-il was dead, his prestige was paramount and anything that went against it would be perceived as treacherous.

The purge of military Chief of Staff Ri Yong Ho, who had insisted on putting military priorities ahead of economic ones, was the defining win for the “moderate” faction. But the OGD and military soon regrouped and retook lost ground through the rocket launch and nuclear test.

In the face of such a bold invocation of Kim Jong-il’s “legacy rule”, Jang Song-thaek and Kim Kyong-hui were unable to provide effective opposition.

The partial successes of these events strengthened the “hard-line” faction and led them to build an atmosphere of military confrontation in response to the UNSC sanctions that followed. The military Chief of Staff’s department regained prominence and the authority of Choe Ryong Hae became void.

Between March and May, when North Korea was in a state of war-readiness, references to ‘side-branches’ re-appeared in North Korean Party lecture materials, alluding to Jang Song-thaek.

In the factionalism that had arisen on the premise of interpreting the legacy of Kim Jong-il, those who chose to stress the economy were losing ground to those who emphasised the military line.

This is why China, being fully aware of these factional tensions, made the unusual move to support UNSC sanctions on this occasion. In effect, it was sending a forceful message to the “hard-line” faction, the ones who claim to represent Kim Jong-il’s military legacy.

Since the death of Kim Jong-il, the definition of roles and responsibilities are increasingly becoming important. The flow of foreign currency from South Korea drying up with the closing of the Kaesong Industrial Complex only makes the problem more urgent.

On one hand, with the loss of an absolute centre of gravity provided by Kim Jong-il, the adverse international climate is negatively affecting the options of the “hard-liners”.

On the other hand, the “moderates” remain at a gross disadvantage: as the entity responsible for Kim Jong-un’s personal protection and policy sanctions is the OGD, other figures and entities have their hands tied in terms of policy approvals.

At the moment, Kim Jong-un’s primary function is as an avatar of his grandfather Kim Il-sung. He has no close associates of his own or any basis of real power.

With Kim Jong-un living under the shadow of his dead father Kim Jong-il’s legacy, the future of North Korean policy and power reconfiguration will be decided by which faction comes out on top in their claim on Kim Jong-il’s legacy.

This article by Jang Jin-sung was originally published in Japan’s Sankei Shimbun on August 1 2013. It is translated here with permission.