The Removal of Jang Song Thaek (Update)

Latest update (Dec 9): North Korea has officially announced the removal of Jang Song-thaek from all positions and his expulsion from the Workers’ Party. The accompanying statement emphasised Kim Jong-un’s legitimacy through mention of ‘legacy politics’, and accused Jang Song-thaek of making ‘arrogant attempts at the Party’s absolute power’ and ‘going against the will of the Supreme Leader (Kim Il-sung) and General (Kim Jong-il)’. The following additional crimes were attributed to Jang: ‘ selling off national resources at too low a price’,  ‘factional manoeuvring’ and the catch-all phrase ‘anti-revolutionary acts’. Other crimes included ‘womanising’, ‘playboy activities’ and ‘drunkenness and general immorality’.

Original piece (Dec 4): The news of Jang Song-thaek’s removal was followed by a range of analyses and interpretations by commentators regarding the veracity of the event and reasons behind it, if considered true. Here is NFI’s most recent understanding of the reasons for his removal, which not only draws on publicly available sources, but also on collective first-hand experience of working inside the regime and information provided to us by long-term correspondents still working inside the regime.

As an overview, the two short-term factors that led to Jang Song-thaek’s removal were his ‘pursuit of economic reform’ and personal attempts at diplomacy. The context for this lies in the ongoing rivalry between the Ministry of People’s Security (controlled by Jang Song-thaek) and the Ministry of State Security (controlled by the Organisation and Guidance Department [OGD] of the Workers’ Party), which was previously overseen and encouraged by Kim Jong-il as a method of checks and balances to threats against his power.

The reality of Kim Jong-un’s era is that the rivalries overseen by Kim Jong-il in the manner of a divide-and-conquer strategy have been playing out; at present, the OGD has come out dominant and Kim Jong-un has lost an option of power.

Note: suggestions have been made that the military security apparatus was involved in the purging of two associates of Jang Song-thaek. We believe this is incorrect, and that justification for Ri Ryong-hwa and Jang Su-gil’s execution was limited to an individual remit.

Additional Note: It’s worth making clear that Jang Song-thaek has lost his position, but not yet his physical safety. Kim Kyong-hui has not lost her position. The main development of note in Jang Song-thaek’s removal is that his status as a ‘side-branch’ has been (re-)confirmed.

Jang Song-thaek’s ‘pursuit of economic reform’ and personal diplomacy

There are two dominant short-term factors behind the removal of Jang Song-thaek. Firstly, Jang based his push for power on the premise of improving the People’s Economy and on ‘pursuing economic reform and opening’. Secondly, Jang circumvented the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and attempted personal diplomacy with the outside world.

The last public activity of Jang Song-thaek was to receive retired wrestler and Japanese politician Antonio Inoki on Nov 7, through the channel of the Chosun Sports Steering Committee, and this provides a good illustration. The power of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs being restricted by the OGD, Jang Song-thaek moved the Chosun Sports Steering Committee to fall under the control of the National Defence Commission, enabling him to conduct foreign exchanges directly. Kim Jong-un’s emphasis on sports in recent months supported the powers and remit of Jang Song-thaek’s steering committee.

Rivalries between the Ministry of People’s Security and the Ministry of State Security

Under the orders of the OGD, the Ministry of State Security had been conducting surveillance on Jang Song-thaek during the past year. In this regard, his removal was a long time in the making and is being perceived to be on the scale of a coup.

Mid-term factors behind Jang Song-thaek’s removal involve the execution of Ryu Gyong of the Ministry of State Security in 2011 by Jang Song-thaek’s Ministry of People’s Security, and the removal of Wu Dong-cheuk of the Ministry of State Security in April 2012 by the same.

Both purges are intertwined with the historical competition for surveillance powers between the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of People’s Security; and more recently, with the surveillance powers of the Ministry of People’s Security coming into partial overlap with those of the Ministry of State Security.

The rivalry between the two institutions came to be inseparable from the competition between Jang Song-thaek and the OGD. During Kim Jong-il’s life, the OGD designated Jang Song-thaek as a side-branch, and tensions between the two powers were acknowledged. For example, when Kim Jong-il was being treated for the after-effects of a stroke and Ri Jae Gang, First Director of the OGD, died of a car accident, rumours spread that it had been at the orders of Jang Song-thaek.

But with the beginning of Kim Jong-un’s rule, Jang Song-thaek prominently repurposed his rivalry with the OGD (continuing as a struggle between the Ministry of People’s Security and Ministry of State Security) to represent a moderate policy that emphasised the People’s Economy, in an attempt to oppose an OGD which champions nuclear development and military-based politics.

What does this mean for Kim Jong Un’s North Korea?

In Kim Jong-un’s era, strategic rivalries overseen by Kim Jong-il have come back to haunt the leadership. After the succession, the legacy of Kim family rule continued on the surface; but behind the scenes, the rival factions could gain no clear upper hand, which was manifested in Kim Jong-un’s announcement of the two-track Byungjin line with equal emphasis on economic and nuclear development.

Although the balance was delicate, it was unfavourable to Jang Song-thaek and this took on importance in the way he pursued his objectives. After Kim Jong-il’s death, the OGD replaced Kim’s de facto powers through its absolute powers over personnel appointment and institutional guidance. While the OGD went to work behind the scenes based on its institutional experience and actual powers, Jang Song-thaek, catapulted into the public eye as the uncle of Kim Jong-un, moved quickly to rely on his status in foreign eyes as his basis for establishing power over domestic or actual bases of power.

The betrayal of Choe Ryong-hae, who had been appointed to lead the KPA General Political Bureau as the right hand man of Jang Song-thaek in 2012, was fatal for Jang. Although Choe Ryong-hae’s appointment as a leading military figure looked good, he had no military experience or military education, and was consequently ostracised among military circles.

Moreover, with powers of military appointment and guidance in the hands of the OGD, Choe held no enforceable powers. Acknowledging that he was at the mercy of military forces, Choe turned his allegiance to the OGD.

It is in this context that while the removal of Jang Song-thaek may suggest that Kim Jong-un’s power has been cemented, the opposite is in fact the case. Kim Jong-un’s opportunity to rely on his uncle Jang Song-thaek and aunt Kim Kyong-hui has been curtailed by those loyal to his father Kim Jong-il and the OGD.

The OGD controls the personal bodyguards of Kim Jong-un, which makes them the most powerful institution in North Korea: the office of protecting Kim Jong-un goes hand in hand with the ability to control directly his contact with the outside world.

However influential the power of Jang Song-thaek and the Ministry of People’s Security, this was an issue in which there was no competition as long as Kim Jong-un was head of state. When even his meetings with his aunt and uncle Kim Kyong-hui and Jang Song-thaek have had to go through the OGD, Jang Song-thaek’s removal was not insurmountable.

There is always a discrepancy between a North Korean player’s surface or public role and their de facto powers. This was the discrepancy perfected by Kim Jong-il in order to play off rivals and check their powers. One who publicly held authority over a vertical structure was not allowed de facto powers in that role; and one with such de facto powers was not allowed to hold a corresponding public role.

This was Kim Jong-il’s ‘cross-shaped rule’, which in Kim Jong-un’s time has become a ‘cross-shaped nightmare’ for many.

Kim Jong-un has lost an option and a faction to play on, and is surrounded more firmly by those who emphasise military policies. We envision that North Korea’s external and internal policies in the next few months will reflect this development.

(A version of this article will be published in the Dec 5 print edition of Sankei Shimbun.)