Kim Jong-un's New Year Speech: what it really means (Part 2 of 2)

Thursday 3rd January, 2013

Click here for Part 1 of this article.

Editor’s note: In this second section, Jang Jin-sung sums up Kim Jong-un’s new year speech and the vision for 2013: first and foremost, this is the year for strengthening Kim’s regime and his rule. The proposed national mood of 2013 and each outlined policy is geared towards stabilizing North Korea’s internal politics. According to Jang, this is Kim Jong-un’s preoccupation. Kim Jong-un is not concerned at present with issues such as reforming the economy or drawing up foreign policy objectives.

Shirley Lee

North Korea’s vision for 2013: as seen through Kim Jong-un’s new year speech

Kim Jong-un’s new year speech contains two thematic halves. The first half summarizes the events and accomplishments of 2012 while the second half lays down objectives for the year ahead. The summary of 2012 boasts of the nation’s political stability and unity after Kim Jong-il’s death. It also pays special attention to the successful rocket launch. The most important part of a new year speech, however, is the second half, in which objectives are set for the coming year. Traditionally, this section is divided into five parts and this year’s speech is no exception.

1: setting the national mood for the year

The North Korean political system, based as it is on an unchanging ideology (at least in theory), maintains internal solidarity and acquiescence by means of ‘national mood variations’ on an underlying theme. The setting of a new year’s national mood is usually connected to a national holiday. Through politicising holidays, citizens can be mobilised for propaganda activities and called to ideological evaluation sessions. The national holidays highlighted for 2013 in this new year speech is the ‘65th Anniversary of the Founding of the DPRK’ and the ’60th Anniversary of Victory in the Homeland Liberation War’. Obviously, this aids in legitimising the third generation of dictatorship. More significantly, it is a declaration that the military spirit of the Korean War has been set as this year’s national mood.

2: the economy

In the new year speech, Kim Jong-un specifies the ‘war slogan that must be borne by the Party and people’: “That spirit which allowed us to conquer space, may it lead to a watershed in our establishment of an economically strong nation!” This slogan does not suggest economic reforms. In fact, it is a dispassionate confirmation of the status quo and commitment to an autonomous economy.

Take the following line for example: “This year, all business activities must further strengthen the existing foundation of an autonomous people’s economy. We must vigorously increase production and improve the stability of people’s lives. The people must prepare their positions for this battle that lies ahead.” There is a phrase here that has greater implications for a continuance of the status quo than ‘autonomous economy’: Kim Jong-un urges for an improvement in ‘the stability of people’s lives’. ‘Stability’ is the objective that is stressed; there is no mention of ‘growth’. Kim Jong-un’s declaration of indifference towards economic reform is summed up when he says,“We will firmly persist in our style of socialist economics. By ensuring that the workers carry out their responsibilities as the protagonists of production, we will endlessly remould and perfect our economic framework.” These are uninspired words. Kim Jong-un’s vacuous non-statement reveals that economic policy is not a pressing concern for him at present.

3: the military

By pointing out that 2013 is the 50th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s proclamation that ‘One man’s valor conquers a hundred men’, we are reminded once again of a military discipline founded on the ‘Mt. Baekdu mindset’ of the Kim Il-sung revolutionary tradition. In addition, Kim Jong-un places special emphasis on the Korea People’s Domestic Army. This conveys his intention to strengthen domestic security.

4: society

Kim Jong-un declares the building of a ‘Socialist-Civilization Strong Nation’. Kim Jong-un is saying that the Kim Jong-un administration is founding a new civilisation. In plain English, this means society will now conform to the new Kim.

5: a political vision?

The workers’ ideological views, potential for enterprise, and attitude to work must fundamentally be transformed!” is Kim’s way of asking for order to be imposed on the political climate. It is significant that Kim puts undue emphasis on the following words: “One’s loyalty and abilities must be evaluated by the Party and people.” This foreshadows more purges for a restructuring in the year ahead.

6: inter-Korean and foreign policy

In terms of inter-Korean policy, the two national holidays mentioned previously refers to North Korea’s three conditions for inter-Korean relations: ‘Korean people first’, ‘Korean people focus’ and ‘Korean solidarity’. This is a direct response to South Korean president-elect Park Geun-hye’s proposal of ‘a condition of trust’ for inter-Korean relations. Simply put, Kim Jong-un is saying that he declines her proposal, and that instead, the North Korean proposal of uriminzokkiri should be the condition of inter-Korean relations.

In terms of foreign policy, Kim Jong-un says that under the conditions of autonomy, peace and friendship North Korea will hold hands with anyone. This too is an uninspired and empty statement.


So what does it all mean?
Kim Jong-un’s ‘proposals’ betray a lack of confidence in his power

Kim Jong-il’s confidence in his power was expressed more in the realm of foreign policy than in his domestic policy. In terms of inter-Korean relations, he made calculated demands. In terms of foreign relations, he did not shy from making demands of the US and using nuclear arms as a lever for ‘co-operation’. In stark contrast to his father’s style, Kim Jong-un’s exploitation of his successful rocket launch has been limited to a domestic audience. For the international community, he used it cautiously, and only for symbolic effect.

A blank space in policy equals a blank space in power: whereas Kim Jong-un’s domestic policy is precisely worded, nothing concrete or tangible is said in terms of foreign policy. This confirms that there is not yet enough unity in the Kim Jong-un administration to continue with previous foreign policies.

There is no economic reform in sight for 2013

When the moranbong band performs, the outside world looks at the music and lights and cautiously interprets it as a signal of reform. Such shows are nothing more than symptoms of a new ‘socialist civilisation’ in Kim Jong-un style, as mentioned earlier in the new year speech. These shows have nothing to do with an actual plan for reform. If Kim Jong-un truly intended to pursue the path of reform, he would have pledged ties with China. Yet there was no mention of this. In fact, he stresses several times the pursuit of an autonomous economy. In North Korean-speak, this means that Kim Jong-un has not given much thought to economic growth. Stability of power is the top priority.

2013 is a transitional year for Kim Jong-un

At the beginning of the new year speech, Kim Jong-un differentiates between officials (Dear comrades!) soldiers and citizens (Valiant people’s soldiers and beloved people of the nation!) and North Koreans abroad (longed-for brothers of our nation!) As mentioned in Part 1, no one but Kim Jong-il was ‘dear’ until this speech, where Kim Jong-un now describes the political elite as ‘dear’ to him. However, a firm expression of his own authority is included in the speech: the officials must be evaluated for their competence. In addition, the role of the internal security forces is stressed, and there is no change to be seen in terms of economic reform or foreign policy. All of this points to a domestic focus for the year.

Finally, with the national holidays of the ‘65th Anniversary of the Founding of the DPRK’ and the ’60th Anniversary of Victory in the Homeland Liberation War’ setting a military tone for the year, 2013 will see more bloody purges.


Kim Jong-un new year speech

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