2014: What North Korea is really saying in its New Year speech

Jang Jin-sung’s commentary is based on unparalleled first-hand experience, as one who intimately understands how North Korea’s surface projections map to its real intentions.

No one can predict the future, and even North Korea itself cannot predict its own future; but in a New Year speech, North Korea reveals the road-map it desires to follow in the year ahead – for those who know how to read it.

First things first: what we must look for in every New Year speech is the “national mood” that is being set. The “national mood” is the measure by which the state will demand or impose upon the people the goals and types of systemic consolidation for the year ahead; internal and foreign policy directions follow on from these.

The “national mood” is determined by the anniversary events highlighted for that year by the New Year speech, in multiples of five and ten years. In North Korea, these events are the focal point of all political and communal demands of the people’s collective psychology.

In this New Year speech, there is a focus on four main anniversary events.

1 – the seventieth year since the founding of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP)

What Kim Jong Un says:

“This year, the battle ahead is a worthwhile battle in order to hasten and accomplish the beautiful ideals and dreams of the people; it is a victor’s march in conjunction with the celebrations that will adorn the glorious seventieth anniversary of the founding of the KWP.”

What it means:

Above all else, the most urgent task for this year is to consolidate public opinion following the execution of Jang Song Thaek, and to strengthen the control and solidarity of the Party by filling the void left after the purging of Jang Song Thaek and his influence.

2 – the fiftieth anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s thesis on agricultural problems

What Kim Jong Un says:

“This year, we come to the meaningful fiftieth anniversary of Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s thesis on socialist agricultural problems.”

What it means:

This nugget is the most content-rich aspect of the whole speech. Contrary to what one might expect, to put such a bold emphasis on a thesis on agricultural problems means (in the logic of North Korean-speak) that the state intends to pursue a hard-line direction in terms of foreign policy, rather than an approach based on superficial appeasement and engagement.

How does this work? The nation must keep food concerns an internal issue and brace itself in the spirit of “self-sufficiency”, in anticipation of the shortage of food that may result from North Korea’s pursuit of a hard-line foreign policy direction.

3 – the fortieth anniversary of the principles of Kim Il Sungism

What Kim Jong Un says:

“It is the fortieth anniversary since our Great General [Kim Jong Il] announced the principles of Kim Il Sungism in our society; we must further strengthen the solidarity of the revolutionary people by means of clarifying the Party’s organisational ideology, and prepare all members of society to becoming supporters of Kim Il Sungism and Kim Jong Ilism.”

What it means:

There will be an emphasis on the Party’s absolute rule.

(Suitably, the backdrop to, and protagonist of, Kim Jong Un’s New Year address ‘in video’ is none other than the OGD headquarters.)

4 – the twentieth anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s final hand-written Korean unification appeal

What Kim Jong Un says:

“This is the twentieth year since the Supreme Leader [Kim Il Sung] released his final hand-written appeal regarding the unification of the homeland… accusations must not be made against pro-DPRK supporters… no Korean must join hands with or tolerate those who are hostile to our nation, they must firmly prevent and destroy such tendencies.”

What it means:

This may sound like North Korea is seeking warmer relations with South Korea, but it means something entirely different: this is a year for psychological warfare directed at South Korean citizens. This year, North Korea does not care for state-level or diplomatic progress in the sphere of inter-Korean relations.

The North Korean state desires instead to ‘engage’ directly with South Korean society, in order to exacerbate polarisation along South Korea’s political spectrum with regard to pro-DPRK or anti-DPRK stances.

North Korea will continue to express solidarity with South Korea’s opposition left wing, whenever it can, in order to accomplish its psychological warfare objectives; and it will pursue civilian appeasement and engagement in the inter-Korean sphere to this end.

Continues here.