The New North Korean Elite: the 10% and the 1%

A North Korean couple get married on Mansudae Avenue in Pyongyang.

The North Korean elite is commonly defined as including Party and state officials, high ranking officers in the Korean People’s Army, and those who have foreign work experience or have family members who have been dispatched abroad. The North Korean elite make up about 10% of the  population, and they have many times the purchasing power of ordinary North Koreans.

But social inequality and income disparities are discernible even among this small section of North Korean elite.

The upper level of North Korean elite enjoy going to karaoke clubs where a single shot of whiskey costs US$12.5. They chat on their PCs and watch foreign broadcasting such as the BBC or NHK on wall-hung televisions. The highest-priced household appliances on sale at Pyongyang’s department stores are targeted at this level of North Korean elite.

This is why diversified marketing strategies that target this elite are emerging, slowly but surely.

An example of this development can be seen in the Mansudae Theatre of the Arts. Previously, only the ruling Kim, senior officials and foreign delegates were granted access to watch performances and attend events at this venue. Even a few years ago, Guard Command personnel were guarding the theater 24 / 7 in order to prohibit entry to ordinary citizens.

Nowadays, however, the Mansudae Theatre of the Arts has become a popular venue for elite weddings and ceremonies. The Mansudae Theatre did not escape the 7.1 enforcements, which were measures that forced state institutions to become self-supportive. Faced with the sudden challenge of having to raise revenue for operations, the theater began to operate on profit-making principles and eventually opened its doors to a wider circle of elite.

Previously, the North Korean elite held their weddings and ceremonies at the nation’s top dining locations, such as Okryu-gwan, Cheongryu-gwan and Cheongchoon-gwan. But once the Mansudae Theatre opened its doors to the wider public, a line was drawn between the ordinary North Korean elite and the upper North Korean elite.

In fact, most of the North Korean elite cannot afford the fees to hire a venue at the Mansudae Theatre. Social distinctions between the top 10% and top 1% economic class of North Koreans have come into clearer definition.

The changing make-up of the North Korean elite has led to a transformation in the state’s fund-raising initiatives, through which government bonds are sold to the wealthy. This is not an obligatory duty that is enforced by law, but the state has attempted to lure more North Korean elite into purchasing government bonds through persistent campaigning, as well as decorating those who purchase the most  bonds with honors in the name of a North Korean “Select People’s Committee.”

The possession of this honor allows its owner to evade certain obligations. This is why such ‘fund-raising’ has ignited competition among the North Korean elite.

Ultimately, whether or not one possesses these honors determines one’s ranking within the elite class. This is one phenomenon through which we can see the North Korean state engaging in marketing that specifically targets the North Korean elite, and thereby maintain a degree of control over individuals influential in market activities.

But, this extreme type of socio-economic competition is restricted to a privileged minority of North Korean society, however much it increasingly becomes the face of North Korea for providing an ‘antidote’ of sorts to the stories of gulags.

The existence of a 10% or a 1% means that there also exists a 90%. Ordinary North Koreans are barred from sharing in the life of the North Korean elite, whose lives are the only ones we have access to as outsiders who engage with ‘North Korea’.